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This paper estimates the unconditional and conditional probabilities that U.S.
interventions successfully smooth short-term mark-dollar and yen-dollar exchange rates.
The sample period extends from February 1987 to February 1990.  Assuming a binomial
distribution, the number of observed successes usually is greater than one would expect to
see randomly.  Results from a logit model suggest that coordinated intervention has a
higher probability of success than unilateral intervention.  The probability of success also
increases with the dollar amount of an intervention.  Other conditioning variables are not
significant.  The paper presents a reaction function, with adjustments for the incidentally
truncated nature of intervention data.  Predicted values serve as instruments for
intervention in the logit models.Introduction
Over the last 23 years of generalized floating, the United States has periodically
bought and sold foreign reserves in an effort to influence exchange rates.  Economists
have questioned the efficacy of U.S. intervention because the Federal Reserve System
routinely sterilizes its impact on the monetary base.  Although the process of sterilizing
intervention alters the currency composition of outstanding government securities,
thereby offering a second possible channel of influence, studies provide no compelling
evidence of significant portfolio-adjustment effects (see Edison [1993]).
Instead, empirical research generally finds neither strong nor consistent
correlations between official interventions and changes in either exchange rates,
exchange-rate risk premia, or measures of exchange-rate volatility.1   Results usually are
not robust across time periods, currencies, or model specifications, suggesting that
success might depend solely on the ability of intervention to affect market expectations.
Most economists regard exchange markets as highly efficient, but information is costly,
and some interval must pass between the receipt of new information and its full
incorporation into foreign exchange quotations.  That monetary authorities might
sometimes possess an information advantage seems possible, but whether they do so
routinely and can regularly exploit this advantage in pursuit of exchange-rate objectives
is questionable.
As a means of studying the expectations channel, this paper estimates the
conditional and unconditional probabilities with which U.S. intervention might smooth
exchange-rate movements.  A high probability of success implies that intervention
regularly affects expectations that underpin foreign exchange quotes.  Conditioning
these probabilities indicates which aspects of intervention increase the chances of
                                                          
1   Dominguez and Frankel (1993) and Ghosh (1992) are possible exceptions.  Edison
(1993) surveys the literature.  See Bonser-Neal and Tanner (forthcoming) for recent
evidence on measures of volatility.2
success.  My sample includes official U.S. intervention data at a daily frequency from
February 1987 to February 1990.  This was a period of frequent and heavy U.S.
intervention--often conducted in concert with Germany and Japan--to stabilize dollar
exchange rates “at current levels” (see Funabashi [1988]).
Section I defines success in terms of a smoothing criterion, counts the number of
successful interventions, and compares that count to the expected number of successes
based on a binomial distribution.  The approach adopted here avoids ambiguities
inherent in regression analysis.  In a regression of exchange-rate changes on
intervention, for example, a positive coefficient may imply a perverse response--foreign
exchange purchases (sales) cause dollar appreciations (depreciations)--or it may imply
that intervention smoothes exchange-rate movements without reversing them.2  In
section I, I find that with one exception (U.S. purchases of German marks), the
probability of observing a greater number of successes than actually occurred is
relatively small, suggesting that intervention affects exchange rates.
Section II asks whether various techniques for intervention improve the chances
of success.  I model the conditional probability of success using the logistic probability
distribution and conditioning variables suggested by other studies.  The results indicate
that central banks can significantly increase the odds of success by coordinating their
interventions.  The dollar amount of intervention is also significant, but it is of
secondary importance to coordination.  Other conditioning variables, notably the oft-
mentioned distinction between reported and unreported intervention, seem unimportant
(see Dominguez and Frankel [1993]).  Section III derives conditional probabilities of
                                                          
2  Similarly, studies of the portfolio-adjustment channel typically define the risk
premium as unexploited profits from an uncovered parity condition.  Then, by assuming
that interest rates and the expected future spot exchange rate are exogenous, they infer
that correlations between intervention and the risk premia solely represent a relationship
between intervention and the spot exchange rate.  This need not be the case.3
success from estimated logit models, and the final section concludes with some policy
implications.
An appendix describes the use of censored regression techniques employed in
constructing reaction functions for intervention.  The predicted values from these
functions serve as instruments for intervention in the logit models.  Failure to account
for the joint determination of exchange-rate changes and intervention can bias parameter
estimates.
I.  Smoothing Exchange-Rate Movements
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as agent for both the U.S. Treasury and
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), intervenes to “counter disorderly
markets.”3  In practice, Treasury and Federal Reserve officials determine market
disorder subjectively, relying on a mutable set of macroeconomic and financial criteria
(see Smith and Madigan [1988]).  As a result, notions of success are similarly inconstant
and subjective, and unlike the criterion presented below, may not bear a one-to-one
relationship with individual interventions.
This paper defines success in terms of smoothing exchange-rate movements.
This criterion is compatible with many definitions of calming market disorder and with
the G7’s Louvre objective of stabilizing dollar exchange rates “at current levels.”
Moreover, empirical estimates of intervention reaction functions report evidence of a
smoothing objective (see Almekinders and Eijffinger [1991, 1992] and Edison [1993]).
Accordingly, I define the following dichotomous success criterion:
                                                          
3  Paragraph 1 of the FOMC’s Foreign Currency Directive states:  “System operations in
foreign currencies shall generally be directed at countering disorderly market conditions,
provided that market exchange rates for the U.S. dollar reflect actions and behavior
consistent with the IMF Article IV, Section 1.”4
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In this expression, It designates official intervention at time t, with positive (negative)
values being sales (purchases) of foreign exchange; DS SPM SAM tt t =- , where SAM
and SPM are, respectively, New York morning and afternoon bid quotations expressed
as foreign currency units per dollar; and DSAMt = SAMt - SAMt-1.  The Federal Reserve
Bank of New York obtains these quotations from surveys of dealers conducted at 9:00
a.m. and 4:00 p.m., respectively.  Nearly all U.S. intervention occurs between these
times, typically while European markets are still open (see Goodhart and Hesse [1993]).
The intervention data do not include purchases and sales that the Federal Reserve
undertakes for official customers and with no intent to influence exchange rates (see
Adams and Henderson [1983]).
As expression (1) indicates, wt equals one--implying success--if intervention sales
(purchases) of foreign exchange are associated with a dollar appreciation (depreciation)
on day t (DSt), or if they are associated with a smaller dollar depreciation (appreciation)
when comparing DSt with DSAMt.4
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York undertakes nearly all of its intervention
in the U.S. market.  During our sample period, every intervention was against German
marks or Japanese yen.  Table 1 presents summary statistics for these interventions.
Figure 1 compares U.S. intervention against marks with mark-dollar exchange-rate
movements, while figure 2 compares U.S. intervention against the yen with the yen-
dollar rate.
Table 2 counts the total number of interventions, n (column #1), and the number
of successful interventions, W (column #2), over our sample period.  Approximately 64
                                                          
4  Notice that this criterion accommodates intervention that leans with the wind.  The
United States has sometimes intervened to reinforce exchange-rate movements, as after
the Plaza Accord in September 1995.5
percent of all U.S. interventions against German marks and nearly 75 percent of all U.S.
interventions against Japanese yen successfully smoothed exchange-rate movements.
Sales of marks or yen were more frequently successful than purchases of these
currencies.
I want to determine, however, if the number of successes is large, since a high
number of successes could result from the natural martingale behavior of spot exchange
rates even if intervention were ineffective.  Under a martingale process, day-to-day
exchange-rate changes have an expected value of zero, with equal probability of
appreciation or depreciation.  Consequently, having observed a depreciation on day t,
the probability of finding a smaller depreciation on day t+1 is greater than 50 percent.
The dichotomous variable, wt, has a Bernoulli distribution with the







binomial distribution, with E(W) = np and Var(W) = np(1-p).5
I estimate p for both intervention purchases and intervention sales following two
procedures.  First, I calculate  $ p1 (column #4 of table 2) as the number of times
smoothing naturally occurred on sample days when the Federal Reserve did not
intervene.  I excluded U.S. intervention days to avoid possible influences from
intervention.  For the German mark, there were 616 such trials, and for the Japanese yen,
625 trials (column #3).  I counted as smoothing 1) the number of appreciations in DSt
plus the number of smaller depreciations when comparing DSt with DSAMt, and 2) the
number of depreciations in DSt plus the number of smaller appreciations when
comparing DSt with DSAMt.
                                                          
5  The success criteria consider only a count of success.  The mean absolute value of
exchange-rate changes--both for German marks and Japanese yen--are significantly
larger on days of U.S. intervention than on days of no U.S. intervention.6
Based on these probabilities ( $ p1’s), one might expect to observe 23 successful
U.S. sales of German marks, 71 successful U.S. purchases of German marks, 42
successful sales of Japanese yen, and 44 successful purchases of Japanese yen even if the
Federal Reserve acted randomly and if intervention were completely ineffective.
Column #6, however, suggests that the probability of randomly observing a greater
number of successes than was actually found is fairly low in every case except that of
U.S. purchases of German marks.6
An underlying assumption in these calculations is that smoothing movements in
exchange rates are independent events.  A substantial body of evidence suggests that
exchange rates follow a martingale process with heteroskedastic error terms.7   The
summary data in table 3 confirm this pattern for our sample.  Martingales do some
damage to the assumption of independent trials, but the offending temporal dependence
appears only in higher moments of the exchange-rate process.  Moreover, official
intervention could create persistence in the variance.  The statistic for biasness in our
sample (m3) is sometimes significant, but its significance often seems sensitive to
whether the sample includes intervention.  (The restricted sample in table 3 excludes
interventions.)  The significant kurtosis (m4) in our sample is consistent with GARCH
effects and a martingale process.
                                                          
6  The differences between U.S. intervention against German marks and Japanese yen
could result from the fact that U.S. intervention was often coordinated with Germany
and Japan over this period, and because Japanese intervention was associated with
innovations in money growth, which markets might then anticipate (see Watanabe
[1994]).  Germany usually tends to sterilize (see Neumann and von Hagen [1991]).
7  A martingale process implies that the expected exchange-rate change is zero and that
the probability of an appreciation or depreciation is equal (i.e., exchange-rate changes
are not biased).  A martingale process also implies that exchange-rate changes are not
serially correlated, but unlike the random-walk hypothesis, it does not require exchange-
rate changes to be independent and identically distributed.  Exchange-rate changes
typically exhibit extreme kurtosis. Baillie and McMahon (1989) provide a detailed
discussion of the statistical properties of exchange-rate changes.7
As a further test, I calculate the probability of observing an individual success,
$ p2 , as the frequency of observing smoothing in 1,000 replications of artificial random-
walk exchange-rate processes.  I construct the series using the calculated second
moments for the German mark and Japanese yen exchange rates.  Each replication
consists of 616 observations for the mark and 625 observations for the yen.
Using the  $ p2 ’s (table 2, column #5), one might expect to observe 22 successful
U.S. sales of German marks, 67 successful U.S. purchases of German marks, 40
successful sales of Japanese yen, and 44 successful purchases of Japanese yen even if the
Federal Reserve acted randomly and if intervention were completely ineffective.
Column #7, however, shows that the probability of randomly observing a greater number
of successes than was actually found is less that 5 percent in every case except that of
U.S. purchases of German marks.
These results confirm the earlier finding:  Successful intervention is not a
random event attributable to the martingale nature of exchange rates.  U.S. intervention
appears to affect information important to the pricing of foreign exchange.
II.  The Odds of Successful Intervention
The United States might improve its chances for success by conducting
intervention in a specific manner or by associating it with other events.  I model the













where wi n i  ( =1,..., ) is the dichotomous success variable described in expression (1).8  I
hypothesize that success is a linear function of explanatory variables:
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.  I estimate the logit model only over observations containing
intervention.8
(3) wi = Xb i ,
where Xi  is a (1 ´ K) vector of variables that influence the probability that intervention
will be successful, and b is a (K ´ 1) column vector of parameters.





















where  $ Pi is the estimated relative frequency of observing wi =1 in n trials, and where
the variance of ui equals 11 [( ) ] nP P ii i -  (see Judge et al. [1988], pp. 788-95).
Included in the conditioning vectors are those variables frequently suggested in
the literature as influencing the likelihood of successful intervention.  Before presenting
the estimates, I discuss the conditioning variables.
Dollar Amount of Intervention
Within the context of the portfolio-adjustment theory of exchange-rate
determination, the amount of an intervention seems crucial, since the exchange-rate
response is a function of the relative change in outstanding government debt.  Within the
context of an expectations channel, the importance of the amount of intervention is
unclear.  Large interventions need not have a substantially greater effect on market
expectations than small interventions.  The Federal Reserve Bank of New York often
undertakes interventions with many commercial banks at different times during the day.
At any point during the day, individual traders, while aware that the Fed is in the market,
may be unaware of the total amounts.  Indicative of this, amounts reported in news
accounts of intervention are often vague or incorrect (see Osterberg and Wetmore
Humes [1993]).
Three measurements attempt to assess the importance of the amount of
intervention.  First, I consider the absolute value of the dollar amount of U.S.
intervention against German marks (ING) and Japanese yen (INJ).  Because intervention9
and exchange-rate movements are jointly determined, estimated coefficients for these
variables are likely to be biased.  Consequently, I also use as instruments the predicted
values of intervention from an appropriately identified reaction function.  These are
IHATG and IHATJ for intervention against marks and yen, respectively.  (The appendix
discusses the sample selection technique used to estimate IHATG and IHATJ.)
As a further test of the importance of an intervention’s size, I construct dummy
variables for large interventions.  BG1 and BJ1 equal one when U.S. interventions
against German marks and Japanese yen are at least one standard deviation above the
mean absolute amount of intervention, as recorded in table 1.
Special Factors Affecting Expectations
Empirical investigations by Loopesko (1984) and Dominguez (1990) suggest that
coordinated central-bank intervention significantly affects exchange rates more often
than does uncoordinated intervention.  Coordinated intervention could affect
expectations more profoundly than unilateral actions if it shows agreement among
central banks about the nature of the information in the market.
Accordingly, the dummy variables, CORDG and CORDJ, equal one,
respectively, when the United States and Germany, and the United States and Japan,
intervene in concert.  I constructed CORDG from official German intervention data, and
CORDJ from published references to Japanese intervention.9  The sample includes 114
coordinated interventions with Germany and 102 coordinated interventions with Japan.
Intervention often occurs over a string of days, with long intermittent periods of
no intervention.  Humpage (1988) found that the first intervention in a string was more
apt to be significantly correlated with exchange-rate changes than were the subsequent
interventions in a series.  Subsequent interventions may not provide new information.
                                                          
9   The Bundesbank provided us with official German intervention data.  The Bank of
Japan keeps intervention data confidential.10
As a further check, I tested a dummy variable, FRST, that equals one when U.S.
intervention against a specific currency is the first in the past five business days.
The New York Fed’s Foreign Exchange Desk can intervene directly with
commercial banks, or it can operate through the broker’s market.  The latter method
affords the System anonymity; the former does not.10  Dominguez and Frankel (1993)
contend that known intervention--proxied by newspaper accounts--affects exchange
rates more often and more strongly than does secret intervention.  Hung (1992)
disagrees, saying that the importance of anonymity depends on the nature of the
information.  Osterberg and Wetmore Humes (1993) question the accuracy of news
accounts.
I consider three dummy variables that measure reported interventions:  1) RI
equals one when The Wall Street Journal reports any intervention activity against the
dollar whatsoever, 2) RIA equals one when The Wall Street Journal specifically refers to
U.S. intervention, and 3) REPINT is the dummy variable for reported intervention found
in Dominguez and Frankel (1993).
Monetary Policy
The Federal Reserve routinely sterilizes U.S. intervention in the sense of not
allowing an intervention to interfere with the attainment of its reserve or federal funds
rate targets.  Nevertheless, unexpected changes in monetary policies can affect exchange
rates, and interventions that coincide with them will appear more successful than they
otherwise would.
During the sample period, the FOMC set its federal funds rate target (FTAR) to
be consistent with the degree of reserve pressure that it desired at a particular time.
                                                          
10 When the Federal Reserve deals directly with a commercial bank, that bank is free to
announce that the Fed is in the market.  When the Fed enters the broker’s market, it gets
a commercial bank to act as its agent.  The broker knows and reveals only the identities
of the commercial banks that are party to the transactions.  The agent bank must keep
the Fed’s transaction secret.11
Often, the FOMC altered FTAR in a policy move to affect the markets, but sometimes it
adjusted the target in response to gradual shifts in underlying market pressures.
Generally, following Sellon (1994), I construct an effective federal funds rate target,
EFTAR, that attempts to measure only discretionary policies designed to operate on the
economy.  In constructing EFTAR, I do not incorporate changes in the borrowing
assumptions that the FOMC undertook for such technical factors as seasonal borrowing,
special situation borrowing, or shifts in the discount spread.  Moreover, I do not relate
the changes in the borrowing assumption to the changes in EFTAR strictly according to
Sellon’s rule, but sometimes deviate if changes in FTAR suggest a different pattern.11
FTAR and EFTAR measure policy changes in basis points, typically 12.5, 25, or
50 (see figure 3).  I also measure monetary policy changes with dummy variables:  T1
equals one when FTAR changes, and T2 equals one when EFTAR changes.  For similar
reasons, I also include a variable for changes in German and Japanese monetary policies.
GMP equals one whenever the German Lombard, discount, or repurchase rate changes;
JMP equals one when either the official Japanese discount rate or the overnight bank
rate changes.
Sterilized intervention that is inconsistent with the thrust of monetary policy
could have a substantially different effect on exchange rates than intervention that is
consistent with monetary policy.  The dummy variable YES equals one if the United
States bought (sold) foreign exchange when the FOMC was lowering (raising) EFTAR.
Other Events
Just as contemporaneous changes in monetary policy may result in successful
intervention, coincidental reports of other events might increase the chances for success.
                                                          
11   Sellon equates every $100 million change in the nonborrowed reserve path to a 25-
basis-point change in the effective funds rate target, and allows changes in the discount
rate to lead to an equal change in the effective funds rate target (see Sellon [1994], pp.
12-13).12
We include the dummy variables CPI, EMP, BOT, and GNP, which equal one,
respectively, on the release days for consumer prices, the unemployment rate, the
monthly balance of trade, and quarterly GNP.  We also include UXCPI, UXEMP,
UXBOT, and UXGNP, which measure differences between the actual and the expected
values of these economic indicators on their release dates.  The expected values are the
median expectations from the Money Market Services surveys of expectations.  NEWS,
also from Dominguez and Frankel (1993), is a catch-all dummy variable for other policy
events that might provide information to the market.
Results
Table 4 (U.S. interventions against German marks) and table 5 (U.S.
interventions against Japanese yen) present the results from estimating the logit function
with each of the explanatory variables included separately.  The odds that U.S.
intervention will successfully smooth exchange-rate movements significantly increase
with the amount of intervention (after adjusting for simultaneity) and when intervention
is coordinated.  For U.S. intervention against German marks, IHATG is significant at the
95 percent confidence level, and CORDG is significant at the 90 percent interval.  For
U.S. intervention against Japanese yen, IHATJ is significant at the 90 percent confidence
level, and CORDJ is significant at the 95 percent level.  None of the other explanatory
variables seems to affect the odds ratio significantly.
We next consider the joint significance of the explanatory variables (tables 6 and
7) by adding combinations of other variables to CORDG and CORDJ.  The first row of
table 6, for example, shows the log likelihood and the likelihood-ratio test of CORDG.
Adding IHATG to CORDG significantly improves the fit, according to the likelihood-
ratio test in column 3.  CORDG and IHATG are jointly significant at the 95 percent
confidence level, according to the likelihood-ratio test in column 2.  Adding T2 to
CORDG similarly improves the fit.  Although FRST and CORDG, and REPINT and
CORDG, are jointly significant at the 95 and 90 percent levels, respectively, all of the13
explanatory power is in CORDG, since adding either FRST or REPINT does not
improve the fit.
I proceed by adding individual variables to CORDG and IHATG.  Although
nearly all are jointly significant at the 95 percent confidence level, the explanatory
power comes solely from IHATG and CORDG.  T2 and REPINT no longer seem to
contribute to the fit.  Table 6 continues to build in a similar manner, but with no
additional results.
The procedure in table 7 parallels that in table 6.  Overall, only coordination and
the amount of intervention seem capable of predicting the success of intervention.12
III.  Conditional Probabilities of Success









Table 8 shows estimates of the conditional probability of success for U.S.
intervention against German marks.  The first column presents estimates of the
conditional probabilities when equation (5) is evaluated using the logit equation that
includes only CORDG:
(6) $ L= 0.095 + 0.687 (CORDG); LL = -92.514;
(0.31) (1.83) LL(0) = -94.184.
By coordinating its intervention against German marks with the Bundesbank, the
United States increases the probability of success from 0.524 to 0.686.  Coordination
seems crucial, given that we expect to observe random smoothing, as a result of the
                                                          
12   Collinearity between the intervention terms and the coordination dummies is not a
problem for U.S. intervention against German marks or Japanese yen.  Neither term is
significant in a regression (OLS or logit, as required) of one on the other.14
martingale nature of exchange rates, in approximately 62 to 65 percent of the
observations.
I next evaluate (5) using a logit equation that includes CORDG and IHATG:
(7) $ Li = -1.694 + 0.794 (CORDG) + 0.019 (IHATG); LL = -83.11;
(-3.06) (1.97) (3.93) LL(0) = -94.18.
Table 8 presents conditional probabilities evaluated at the mean value of IHATG and for
the mean plus or minus one standard deviation.  The amount of an intervention seems to
increase the probability of success above what one might expect to observe randomly
only when it is also coordinated, or when it is uncoordinated but very large (mean plus
one standard deviation).  At one standard deviation above the mean, the probability of
success is 73 percent in the absence of coordination.  The final column of table 8
presents the change in the probability of success (evaluated at the mean) for a marginal
change in IHATG.  The effect is minuscule.
Table 9 shows estimates of the conditional probability of success for U.S.
intervention against Japanese yen.  The first column presents estimates of the
conditional probabilities when equation (5) is evaluated using the logit equation that
includes only CORDJ:
(8) $ L = 0.095 + 1.226 (CORDJ); LL = -73.203;
(0.22) (2.48) LL(0) = -76.189.
By coordinating its intervention against the yen with the Bank of Japan, the
United States increases the probability of success from 0.524 to 0.789.  Coordination
seems crucial for success, given that we expect to observe random smoothing in
approximately 62 percent to 66 percent of the observations without interventions.
I next evaluate (5) using a logit equation that includes CORDJ and IHATJ:
(9) $ L = -0.307 + 1.182 (CORDJ) + 0.005 (IHATJ); LL = -71.611;
(-0.62) (2.37) (1.70) LL(0) = -76.189.15
Table 9 presents conditional probabilities evaluated at the mean value of IHATJ and the
mean plus or minus one standard deviation.  The amount of an intervention seems to
increase the probability of success above what one might expect to observe if
intervention were ineffective and undertaken randomly only when it is also coordinated.
Even at one standard deviation above the mean, the probability of success is only 64
percent in the absence of coordination.  The final column of table 9 presents the change
in the probability of success (evaluated at the mean) given a marginal change in IHATJ.
The effect is very small and independent of coordination.
IV.  Conclusions
Most economists accept that U.S. monetary authorities may sometimes possess
an information advantage over the foreign exchange market, but question whether they
can use it to pursue an exchange-rate objective.  My results suggest that U.S.
intervention frequently conveys information important to the pricing of foreign
exchange.  Over the sample period, I find that the observed number of successful
interventions usually are greater than one would expect to uncover under a martingale
exchange-rate process, if interventions were ineffectual and random.
Coordinating intervention significantly increases the chances of success.  Other
things equal, uncoordinated intervention has only about a 50 percent chance of being
successful.  The size of an intervention also affects its probability of success, but
coordination is generally a better predictor.  Interventions typically must approximate
one standard deviation above their mean value to affect success in the absence of
coordination, but central banks can achieve a similar probability of success at a much
lower dollar amount of intervention through coordination.  Other distinctions, such as
between reported and unreported intervention or between first and subsequent
interventions, have no impact on the likelihood of success.16
Two policy recommendations stem from these findings:  1) Central banks should
coordinate their interventions, and 2) Maintaining a large portfolio of foreign exchange
to facilitate frequent and large interventions seems unnecessary.17
Table 1:  U.S. Intervention: Basic Statistics
(millions of dollars)





Mean 162.3 138.2 150.9 156.1 122.4 147.7
Median 130.0 100.0 120.0 100.0   80.0 100.0
Std. Dev. 115.4 135.0 125.2 117.3 105.3 115.0
Minimum     6.0     3.0     3.0   25.0   15.0   15.0
Maximum 555.0 720.2 720.2 695.0 395.0 695.0
Source:  All tables are author’s calculations.18
Table 2:
Success Criterion:  Smoothing Movements in the Targeted Exchange Rate
(February 18, 1987 to February 23, 1990)
                                    #1        #2         #3       #4        #5        #6        #7
      German Marks
Sales    36   27   616  0.65 0.62 0.07  0.04
Purchases  108   65   616  0.65 0.62 0.85  0.65
      Japanese Yen
Sales    64   50   625   0.66  0.62  0.01 <0.01
Purchases    71   51   625   0.63  0.62  0.04   0.04
Column:
#1:  Official interventions in full sample, n.
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, where T=760 observations in full sample.  One
can count success over the entire sample or over interventions.
#3:  Observations excluding interventions, T-n.
#4:   $ /( ) pST n 11 =- , where S1 is the number of times smoothing is observed in T-n.
 In the rows marked sales: S1 is the number of appreciations in DSt plus the number of
smaller depreciations when comparing DSt with DSAMt, for all observations excluding
interventions.  In the rows marked purchases: S1 is the number of depreciations in DSt
plus the number of smaller appreciations when comparing DSt with DSAMt, for all
observations excluding interventions.
#5:   $ p2  is the average frequency of observing smoothing in 1,000 replications of an
artificial random-walk process, using the first and second moments for either the
German mark or Japanese yen (see table 3).  Each replication consists of 616
observations for the mark and 625 observations for the yen.  Smoothing is as defined in
#4.
#6:  Probability of observing a greater number of successes than was actually
observed (column #2) in a sample equal to the number of interventions (column #1),
using  $ p1 as the probability of an individual success.
#7:  Probability of observing a greater number of successes than was actually
observed (column #2) in a sample equal to the number of interventions (column #1),
using  $ p2 as the probability of an individual success.19
 Table 3:  Exchange-Rate Changes: Basic Statistics
German Mark
Full Sample (n = 760)










-2 -0.6* 6.9* 377 371 497 491  10.3 41.1*
DSAM -0.2-10
-3 0.1-10
-1 0.1 4.1*  --   --   --   --   15.3 73.4*
DSPM -0.2-10
-3 0.1-10
-1 -0.1 5.1*  --   --   --   --     5.5 33.9*
Restricted Sample (n = 616)










-2 -0.1 4.4* 295 312 398 403   --    --
DSAM -0.5-10
-3 0.1-10
-1 0.0 4.2*  --   --   --   --    --    --
DSPM -0.4-10
-3 0.1-10
-1 0.0 5.3*  --   --   --   --    --    --
Japanese Yen
Full Sample (n = 760)









-1    0.6 -1.5*18.8* 388 354 508 411  14.8   16.6**
DSAM -0.8-10
-2    0.9 -0.3*  6.4*  --   --   --   --   20.5*
7 133.5*
DSPM -0.8-10
-2    1.0 0.0  6.0*  --   --   --   --     4.1   78.9*
Restricted Sample (n = 625)








DS   0.3-10
-1    0.5   0.1 5.2* 328 280 411 391   --    --
DSAM   0.3-10
-1    0.8   0.2* 4.9*  --   --   --   --    --    --
DSPM   0.3-10
-1    0.9   0.4* 6.4*  --   --   --   --    --    --
* / **  statistically significant at a 95 percent / 90 percent confidence interval,
respectively.
DS SPM SAM tt =- ; DSAM SAM SAM tt =- - 1 ; DSPM SPM SPM tt =- - 1
Notes:
1.  Number of appreciations for DS.
2.  Number of depreciations for DS.
3.  Number of appreciations for DS plus smaller depreciations when comparing DS with
     DSAM.
4. Number of depreciations for DS plus smaller appreciations when comparing DS with
     DSAM.
5.  Box-Pierce Portmanteau Test for autocorrelation in exchange-rate changes with 10
     lags.  Not applicable to the restricted samples.
6.  Box-Pierce Portmanteau Test for autocorrelation in squared exchange-rate changes
with 10 lags as preliminary test for GARCH. Not applicable to the restricted samples.
7.  DSAMfor the Japanese yen contains a single significant autocorrelation at lag 6.20
Table 4:  Effect of Individual Variables on the Odds Ratio
for Successful U.S. Intervention against German Marks
1
Coefficient t-statistic Constant t-statistic LR test
2
Intervention Amounts
ING -0.001  -0.463  0.674  2.375  0.213
IHATG  0.017   3.869 -1.097 -2.441 18.215
BG1 -0.169  -0.389  0.604  3.109   0.150
Special Factors
CORDG 0.687 1.831 0.095 0.308 3.341
FRST 0.553 1.083 0.489 2.610 1.242
RI 0.013 0.027 0.560 1.263 0.001
RIA -0.373 -0.956 0.836 2.518 0.933
REPINT 0.224 0.613 0.423 1.433 0.374
Monetary Policy
FTAR 11.314 0.885 0.538 3.070 1.428
EFTAR 83.431 0.051 0.537 3.079 2.724
T1 0.841 0.743 0.546 3.100 0.638
T2 10.973 0.060 0.537 3.079 2.724
GMP -0.597 -0.714 0.597 3.355 0.504
YES -0.083 -0.215 0.594 2.899 0.046
Other Announcements
CPI 1.075 0.969 0.534 3.028 1.153
UXCPI -1.207 -0.155 0.575 3.270 0.024
EMP -0.422 -0.667 0.604 3.331 0.438
UXEMP -1.605 -0.394 0.587 3.285 0.153
BOT 0.556 0.666 0.542 3.049 0.478
UXBOT 0.197 0.457 0.555 3.147 0.224
GNP -1.322 -1.495 0.629 3.517 2.409
UXGNP -0.631 -0.364 0.581 3.302 0.131
NEW -0.372 -0.535 0.595 3.308 0.282
1.  Sample period extends from 2/18/87 to 2/23/90 and includes n = 144 interventions, of
which W = 92 were successful according to expression (1).
2.  Likelihood-ratio test with one degree of freedom.  Critical values are C. . 05
2 3841 = ;
C. . 10
2 2 706 = .21
Table 5:  Effect of Individual Variables on the Odds Ratio
for Successful U.S. Intervention against Japanese Yen
1





INJ 0.000 0.072 1.071 3.440 0.005
IHATJ 0.006 1.825 0.629 2.068 3.716
BJ1 0.103 0.168 1.076 5.090 0.029
Special Factors
CORDJ 1.226 2.484 0.095 0.218 5.972
FRST 0.012 0.023 1.087 4.972 0.001
RI -0.088 -0.158 1.163 2.270 0.025
RIA -0.057 -0.143 1.122 3.647 0.020
REPINT 0.222 0.557 0.965 3.285 0.310
Monetary Policy
FTAR 153.46 0.066 1.048 5.260 2.362
EFTAR 75.385 0.058 1.069 5.377 1.171
T1 10.462 0.066 1.048 5.260 2.362
T2 9.442 0.070 1.069 5.377 1.171
JMP 0.377 0.816 0.799 1.989 0.649
YES 0.143 0.345 1.036 4.175 0.120
Other Announcements
CPI 11.494 0.058 1.017 5.081 4.190
UXCPI 110.23 0.060 1.028 5.142 3.575
EMP 0.309 0.271 1.078 5.350 0.078
UXEMP 4.726 0.526 1.069 5.323 0.332
BOT 11.494 0.058 1.017 5.081 4.190
UXBOT 46.921 0.052 1.017 5.081 4.190
GNP 0.308 0.271 1.078 5.350 0.078
UXGNP 1.658 0.593 1.068 5.353 0.598
NEW -0.310 -0.486 1.121 5.330 0.229
1.  Sample period extends from 2/18/87 to 2/23/90 and includes n = 135 interventions, of
which W = 101 were successful according to expression (1).
2.  Likelihood-ratio test with one degree of freedom.  Critical values are C. . 05
2 3841 = ;
C. . 10
2 2 706 = .22
Table 6:  Test of the Joint Significance of Variables on the Odds







CORDG -92.514   3.341* --
plus T2 -91.094   6.180*    2.84**
plus FRST -91.538     5.291** 1.95
plus REPINT -92.441 3.485 0.15
plus GMP -92.281 3.807 0.47
plus YES -92.481 3.406 0.07
plus IHAT -83.114 22.139* 18.80*
CORDG, IHATG -83.114 22.139* --
plus T2 -81.765 24.837* 2.70
plus FRST -82.412 23.543* 1.40
plus REPINT -83.072 22.224* 0.08
plus GMP -82.998 22.373* 0.23
plus YES -83.064 22.240* 0.10
CORDG, IHATG, T2 -81.765 24.837* --
plus FRST -81.325    25.718* 0.88
plus REPINT -81.679 25.010* 0.17
plus GMP -81.667 25.033* 0.20
plus YES -81.706 24.955* 0.12
CORDG, IHATG,
GMP -82.998 22.373* --
plus FRST -82.286 23.795* 1.42
plus REPINT -82.943 22.482* 0.10
plus T2 -81.667 25.033* 2.66
plus YES -82.950 22.468* 0.10
1.  Sample period extends from 2/18/87 to 2/23/90 and includes n = 144 interventions, of
which W = 92 were successful according to expression (1).
2.  Likelihood-ratio test compares the log likelihood function with all variables to the
log likelihood with only the constant.
3.  Likelihood ratio tests the significance of adding a variable to that/those listed at the
top of each block.
  *  significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
**  significant at the 90 percent confidence level.2324
Table 7:  Test of the Joint Significance of Variables on the Odds
Ratio for Successful U.S. Intervention against Japanese Yen
1
Log Likelihood LR test
2 LR test
3
CORDJ -73.20 5.97* --
plus T2 -72.30 7.79* 1.80
plus FRST -73.14 6.09* 0.12
plus REPINT -73.17 6.03* 0.06
plus JMP -72.91 6.55* 0.58
plus YES -72.86 6.65* 0.80
plus  IHATJ -71.61 9.16*     3.18**
CORDJ, IHATJ -71.61 9.16* --
plus FRST -71.48 9.42* 0.26
plus REPINT -71.53 9.32* 0.16
plus JMP -71.27 9.84* 0.68
plus YES -71.19 9.84* 0.84
plus T2 -70.63 11.12* 1.96
CORDJ, IHATJ, T2 -70.63 11.12* --
plus FRST -70.51 11.36* 0.24
plus REPINT -70.56 11.25* 0.14
plus JMP -70.24 11.90* 0.78
plus YES -70.33 11.72* 0.60
CORDJ, IHATJ, JMP -70.24 11.90* --
plus FRST -71.13 10.11* 0.28
plus REPINT -71.20   9.99* 0.14
plus T2 -70.24 11.90* 2.06
plus YES -70.88 10.62* 0.78
1.  Sample period extends from 2/18/87 to 2/23/90 and includes n = 135 interventions, of
which W = 101 were successful according to expression (1).
2.  Likelihood-ratio test compares the log likelihood function with all variables to the
log likelihood with only the constant.
3.  Likelihood ratio tests the significance of adding a variable to that/those listed at the
top of each block.
  *  significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
**  significant at the 90 percent confidence level.25
Table  8:  Estimated Conditional Probabilities of Successful
  U.S. Intervention against German Marks
    (I)___                    (II)___________       (III)__
m-sm m + s dd Fx i () ×
Coordinate Intervention
CORDG = 1 0.686 0.514 0.716 0.857 0.004
CORDG = 0 0.524 0.324 0.532 0.730 0.005
Unconditional Probability of Success:  [92 successes / 144 interventions] = 0.639
Notes:
(I)   Based on:  L = 0.095 + 0.687 (CORDG); LL = -92.514;
(0.31) (1.83) LL(0) = -94.184.
(II)  Based on:  L = -1.694 + 0.794 (CORDG) + 0.019 (IHATG); LL = -83.11;
(-3.06) (1.973) (3.93) LL(0) = -94.18.
(III)  Derivative of the logistic cumulative density function with respect to IHATG,
evaluated using the equation in (II).26
Table  9:  Estimated Conditional Probabilities of Successful
U.S. Intervention against Japanese Yen
    (I)___                    (II)___________      (III)__
m-sm  m + s dd Fx i () ×
Coordinate Intervention
CORDJ = 1 0.789 0.722 0.795 0.853 0.001
CORDJ = 0 0.524 0.444 0.543 0.639 0.001
Unconditional Probability of Success:  [101 successes / 135 interventions] = 0.748
Notes:
(I)   Based on:   $ L = 0.095 + 1.226 (CORDJ); LL = -73.203;
(0.22) (2.48) LL(0) = -76.189.
(II)  Based on:   $ L = -0.307 + 1.182 (CORDJ) + 0.005(IHATJ); LL = -71.611;
(-0.62) (2.37) (1.70) LL(0) = -76.189.
(III)  Derivative of the logistic cumulative density function with respect to IHATJ,
evaluated using the equation in (II).27
Appendix:
Central-Bank Reaction Function
Empirical studies of intervention must confront the simultaneous nature of
intervention and exchange-rate changes.  Researchers, using high-frequency data, often
opt for lagging intervention one period; however, this may create a specification bias.
To deal with the simultaneity problem, I estimate a U.S. intervention reaction function
and generate the predicted values as instruments for intervention.
Specification
Intervention to smooth exchange-rate movements could take a continuum of
values, depending on the size of day-to-day exchange-rate movements.  Instead, one
observes episodic interventions only under certain market conditions that occur at
discrete intervals.  That is, intervention data are incidentally truncated.  To construct an
unbiased reaction function, I 1) estimate a probit model for the decision to intervene and
calculate the inverse Mills ratio, and 2) estimate a separate equation for the amount of
intervention, using the inverse Mills ratio to correct for sample selection bias (see
Greene [1993], pp. 706-714).
Equation (A1) describes the decision to intervene:
(A1) Zu tt
* =+ Va t ,
and equation A2 describes the amount of intervention:
(A2) ytt =+ Wg t e ,
where yt is observed only when Zt
* > 0, and where
(,) ~ , ,] u tt es s r me  bivariate normal [0,0,
22 .28
The expected value of y conditioned on intervention actually taking place is
(A3) Eyy EyZ tt t t [[ ]  is observed]=
* > 0
         =+ > Wg Va tt Eu tt [] e











The bracketed term on the right-hand side of the final expression in (A3) is the Mills
ratio.  This term is derived from the conditional probability theorem.  f() × is the normal
density function, and F() ×  is the cumulative normal density function.
Estimation
A least squares regression of (A2) produces inconsistent estimates of the
parameters in g .  Introducing the Mills ratio takes account of the sample selection bias.
The selection variable Z* is not observed; we know only that intervention has taken
place (Z*>0) or has not taken place (Z*=0).  Because Z* has no scale, we must also
assume that s u =1.  The two-step procedure described in Heckman (1979) gives
consistent estimates of the parameters in (A3), but a maximum-likelihood technique
offers more efficient estimates than does the Heckman procedure.
I specify separate models for U.S. intervention against German marks and
Japanese yen.  I describe the decision to intervene as a function of deviations from a 10-
day moving average of the exchange rate, MOVAG, and a 10-day rolling standard
deviation, SIG.  The former captures deviations from recent trends; the latter serves as a
broader measure of exchange-rate volatility (market disorder).29
I depict the amount of intervention as a function of recent exchange-rate changes
and the FOMC’s expressed concern about dollar exchange rates.  While deviations from
trend and volatility may trigger intervention, the size of the most recent exchange-rate
change may influence the amount of the transaction.  I include DSAMt--the day-to-day
change in the morning quotation--expecting large changes in this rate to trigger big
interventions.  I rely on Du (the variable for FOMC concern about the dollar) for
identification.
Furlong (1989) suggests that the order in which the FOMC specifies its policy
objectives in the last paragraph of its domestic policy directive indicates that objective’s
relative importance to the Committee’s recent monetary policy decisions.  During my
sample period, the specified policy objectives always consist of monetary aggregates,
real economic conditions, inflation, exchange-market conditions, and domestic financial
market conditions.  We include a dummy variable  Du  that equals one between FOMC
meetings at which the Committee mentioned exchange-market conditions first or second
in the domestic policy directive.
Table A1 presents estimates of the reaction functions for U.S. intervention
against German marks and Japanese yen.  All coefficients are statistically significant
and have the expected sign exceptrem (, )  in the German mark model and DSAMt in the
Japanese yen model.  The predicted values for intervention from these estimated
equations (IHATG and IHATJ) are instruments for intervention in the logit equations
that appear in the body of this paper.30
Table A1:
Estimates of U.S. Intervention Reaction Functions
Using Sample Selection Techniques
                 German Mark    Japanese Yen
Equation (A1) Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
MOVAVG 9.23 1.87 0.15 3.26
SIGMA 40.05 3.76 0.49 5.22
Constant -1.66 -12.11 -1.76 -15.20
Equation (A2)
DSAMt -3016.00  -4.04 -13.20 -1.46
DU 166.48 2.05 201.51 5.46
Constant -105.92 -2.14 -289.84 -6.27
s e 152.23 20.66 212.93 9.53
rem (,) 0.07 0.28 0.82 10.24
Log likelihood -1268.10 1178.6031
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258-286.FIGURE 1: U.S. INTERVENTION AND THE GERMAN MARK
Note: Positive (negative) interventions are mark sales (purchases).  
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Note: Positive (negative) interventions are yen sales (purchases).  
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